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Governance and Globalization: 
Security privatization on the US-Mexican Border.  A new role for non-state 
actors in security provision? 
 
Abstract: The domain of security is currently being framed and governed in new ways, involving a 
broader range of issues and organizational forms. Such organizational forms include non-state 
actors – e.g. private businesses and NGOs - operating at multiple levels and stretching the concept 
of security into new policy areas. Drawing on theories of governance and preliminary empirical 
findings, this paper sketches the security domain and its transformation in the San Diego-Tijuana 
border region of Southern California.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is about the changing character of the security problem in a border region – the 
San Diego-Tijuana region of Southern California (US) and Baja California (Mexico). The 
developments in this border region are seen as exemplifying the changing nature of the state in the 
face of globalization, with the problem of security as an apposite example. For one thing, economic 
globalization and international integration have changed the nature of sovereignty, and the role of 
the nation-state in handling security matters has been modified. Other actors have been brought into 
the picture: regional and local authorities, NGOs and not least businesses are participating, greatly 
dispersing the handling of many issues, not least the problem of security. Secondly, the meaning of 
’security’ has changed, and security concerns now address social and economic issues as much as 
problems of violent conflict. The domain of security – the field where issues of security are defined 
and acted upon – is, in other words, framed and governed in new ways, involving a broader range of 
issues and actors and new organizational forms that operate at multiple levels. 
The present paper constitutes the preliminary steps in preparation for a study of the security 
domain and its transformations. As such it serves to map out the orientation of future empirical 
work on the division of labour between the state and non-state actors, including private business, in 
the security domain and the effects of this on statecraft. Against this backdrop, we have chosen to 
focus on a border region for two reasons. In border regions we encounter the classical form of 
security institutionalization, involving national/federal authorities on both sides of the border: the 
military and police inspection and regulation of transborder flows of commodities and persons. The 
security concept articulated in relation to the material and human movement in border regions is 
conventionally that of ‘national security’, which in turn is linked to the notion of ‘national 
interests’. Importantly, these concepts incorporate the rationality of sovereignty and its concomitant 
anticipation of inter-state conflict. Second, in some border regions security institutionalization 
entails somewhat more than the regulation of transborder flows, adding lower levels of state 
authority and increasingly also non-state actors to the handling of issues stemming from fierce 
urbanization: traffic safety, social and environmental matters, conflicts over work and property, and 
urban crime. The security concept articulated in relation to such matters is conventionally relating 
to intra-state affairs and conflicts, e.g. ‘urban security’ or ‘human security’.             
Evidently, a special feature of the SD-T border region is its high level of cross-border 
interaction in a context of deep social and economic cross-border inequality. The border also 
demarcates sharp political and institutional differences, and a high degree of cultural complexity is 
present on both sides of it. The complexity of this situation notwithstanding, political co-operation 
between the two cities has been growing since the early 1990s. A multitude of actors and agendas 
have become involved in the management of security, ranging from state authorities at different 
levels, over NGOs and public safety councils to private security companies. Such processes make 
the SD-T border a very interesting case: it demonstrates the simultaneous presence of classical, 
inter-state security institutionalization and intra-state security institutionalization at the urban levels, 
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and it witnesses an emerging local transborder governance agenda which to some extent challenges 
traditional, federal thinking on both sides of the border. Thus the SD-T border region appears to be 
an ideal laboratory for studying the transformation of the security domain and the role of state 
authorities, a condensation of characteristic effects of globalization and regionalization.  
          Section 1 sketches a regime framework, which has shaped transformations of the security 
domain, through the lens of ‘governance’ (Pierre 2000): Conceptually, governance usually refers to 
the co-ordination of social systems and the role of the state in that process (Pierre 2000:3). The 
focus will be on the two states’ capacities for steering the domain of security in a border region, 
where an interesting instantiation of dispersed governance can be observed and where current 
developments challenge and stretch the concept of multi-level governance. Globalization and 
international integration are changing the nature of sovereignty and diminishing the role of the 
nation-state in handling security matters. This development reflects deep changes in the way ruling 
is conceived of and practiced.  
Section 2 will briefly examine the security domain in the SD-T region – how it is represented, 
institutionalized and handled locally by a variety of social and political actors. The section does not 
pretend to give a systematic overview of the security problems or issues present in the region. 
Rather, it seeks to capture some of the fora and organizational forms that in different ways construct 
and operate in the domain of security, with a particular eye to their institutionalization and 
discourses of security. Produced and disseminated in networks that negotiate societal issues, such 
discourses can be seen as part of the practices of power and ruling (Salskov-Iversen, Hansen and 
Bislev 2000; Miller and Rose 1990). 
 
 
1. Globalization, the state and transnational integration  
             
Ever since it began to make sense to think of San Diego and Tijuana as a region, 
rather than merely two adjacent geographical spaces, this region was set to undergo some form of 
‘spontaneous’ integration: after the US conquest of California, a line was drawn in the sand, and 
south of it, Mexico continued as Baja California. There was little of economic interest going on 
south of the line, so, for a long while, the pressure on the newly-established national border was 
negligible; the border was guarded, but not with any great efficiency. 
            However, when national regulations and federal subsidies created a prosperous US-
Californian agricultural sector, the border was activated as an institution of critical importance in 
the attempts at controlling the increasing flows of people and goods. The city of San Diego also 
grew, Tijuana became established as a leisure spot for US citizens, traffic across the border 
expanded and the national governments on both sides began to pay more attention to the economic 
potential of the region. The existence of a national border was not an absolute hindrance to 
transactions across it, on the contrary. Over time it was increasingly being used to create traffic that 
might otherwise not have taken place. Cross-border movement expanded from 1942 and onwards as 
the federal governments of the United States and Mexico formally created the ‘Bracero Program’ to 
allow Mexicans to cross the border legally in search for work wherever labour was needed in the 
United States. The Bracero Program initiated a heavy and persistent flow of migrants from Mexico and 
other Latin American countries to the borderlands, and in particular to Tijuana. Northern Mexico 
gradually emerged as a region of settlement and production, in part as a result of a federal strategy 
to strengthen the border region’s infrastructure. In 1965, the Mexican government introduced the 
Border Industrialization Program (BIP). Its purpose was to turn the region into a dynamic growth 
pole and to relieve unemployment in border cities. The government now permitted Mexican and 
foreign-owned factories to operate along the border duty-free, on condition that they exported all their 
products. This strategy paved the way for the ‘maquiladora industry’ which took the form of plants 
assembling industrial goods, principally for transnational corporations with US–headquarters (Sklair 
1993). Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, this type of industrial development, embedded in 
patterns of flexible accumulation and specialization (Harvey 1990), acquired a crucial importance for 
the entire border region, bringing with it thousands of jobs. 
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          For local authorities on both sides of the border the social and environmental implications of 
these developments soon proved daunting: witness problems of housing and urban infrastructure 
related to the rapid inflow of migrants and industrial plants, problems of public security and safety 
related to illegal migration, and problems of environment caused by the almost unrestricted 
maquiladora industry. In particular on the Mexican side, the state and local governments were not 
sufficiently funded, nor technically trained and organized to provide legally based solutions to both 
the scale and the nature of these problems, including the growth of illegal drug-trafficking (Herzog 
1990:109).  
          Attempts at co-operating across the border to contain the effects of rapid social change were 
regularly frustrated by the cultural and social cleavages between the two nations. In the early 
nineties, however, the North American Free Trade Agreement was negotiated and signed, despite 
traditions of skepticism and a difficult economic conjuncture on the Mexican side (Milner 1999). 
The three North American states bound themselves to liberalize economic exchanges in a number of 
fields, and agreed to follow a certain set of institutional procedures when disagreements over those 
principles arose (Clement ea. 1999). Thus NAFTA institutionalized a considerable degree of 
economic integration between the three states, lowering the thresholds for trade and other 
exchanges among them, and paving the way for fast growing flows of goods, services and ideas 
across the borders. In the process, it effectively diminished the traditional repertoire of government 
powers and techniques hitherto enjoyed by the three states. 
          Specific aspects of the NAFTA construction are intended to weaken the power of the state: 
state functions that have been taken from the three member states have not been transferred to a 
supra-national authority. Instead, they have been placed outside the reach of the political system. 
Breaches of NAFTA regulations are dealt with through litigation, in court-like arbitration panels.  In 
this way, NAFTA can be seen as an attempt at drastically reducing political interference with 
business: the neoliberal rationality from the early 1990s is enshrined in NAFTA stipulations against 
public regulation and interference (Bislev 1999; Grinspun and Kreklewich 1999), which in very 
clear terms state that member states are not allowed to assume new functions or take over new areas 
– change is only allowed in the other direction, towards less state and more market. The trend is 
thus set towards a state that is less present in society. 
          North American states have weakened themselves by writing these market-enhancing clauses 
into the NAFTA treaty. But even if the sovereignty of the state has been undermined by such 
restrictions, the very existence of NAFTA nevertheless adds an extra layer and a new rationality to 
the system(s) of governance in the region. The present situation in the SD-T region is one of added 
complexity, of multi-level governance (Hooghe 1996), of conflicting goals and overlapping 
jurisdictions. In this, NAFTA reproduces some of the processes in European integration, where 
multi-level governance is a much-debated problem. The North American structure, however, is 
rather different from the European one. In the EU, specific competencies have been transferred to 
EU institutions as a supra-national authority, and the EU has ambitions also in non-economic areas 
like the social field, education and the environment. In NAFTA, these issues are handled in side 
agreements which do not form part of the institutionalization of NAFTA and depend upon further 
political processes for eventual implementation. 
          Both the NAFTA and the EU can be understood as instances of globalization – as regional 
integration schemes interpreting and implementing the trends towards increasing global 
interconnectedness (Dicken 1988; Tomlinson 1999). They do it in different ways, but both schemes 
involve considerable changes of the nature of stateness – not least visible in the security domain. 
The classical Weberian definition of the state as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Gerth and Mills (1958): 
78 [Weber 1918]) becomes less adequate for understanding a state that must now compete with 
other organizations of organized force. A state that is also less capable of handling the novel 
versions of security – environmental and human security - and whose ability to command allegiance 
and manage identity may therefore suffer (Wallace 1995; Kersbergen 2000). 
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1.1. Changed concepts of security 
 
          Globalization plays an important but ambiguous role for the current understanding and 
framing of security.  If  ‘functional integration’ is an important characteristic of globalization 
(Dicken 1988), many theories of international conflict would suggest that societies depending on 
each other for vital functions will not engage in armed conflict (LeBillon and Duffield 2000). And 
if globalization brings convergence around a democratic capitalist model (Fukuyama 1992), other 
theories will predict that democracies do not wage war against each other – or rarely do so 
(Sørensen 1993: 91 ff.; Kegley and Wittkopf 1999: 52 f.). On the other hand, globalization has 
meant an increasing role for market forces and therefore growing disparities in the wealth of 
different nations: while bringing prosperity to nations that successfully integrate, it has brought 
further misery to those that fall behind. In some cases, though not in all, globalization has also 
implied an increase in domestic inequality. World Bank data show that on an aggregated level, there 
is no correlation between international integration, measured as trade exposure, and domestic social 
inequality (Lambright and v.d.Walle 2000). If, however, globalization is operationalized as 
institutional liberalization of the economy, there is a strong correlation: in Mexico, for example, 
liberalizing reforms in the 1980s were followed by an increasing Gini co-efficient – from 0.419 in 
1984 to 0.519 in 1994 (Stewart and Berry 1999: 171).  
          Before the welfare state, the term of security was much less used, and talk was about 
‘defence’ (itself a euphemism for ‘war’), when threats to the existence of states were discussed. The 
advent of the welfare state meant that the state became a popular project. A new governmentality 
took over (Dean 1999), aimed at increasing not the might of the nation, but the welfare of the 
people. Security remained a national project, and threats, although they could be broadly defined, 
were threats against the existence of the nation-state. In his treatise on national security, Buzan 
extended the concept of security but clearly still saw it in terms of physical safety (Buzan, 1991).  
          Today, security is viewed as a much broader phenomenon. The end of the Cold War brought 
to a close a number of inter-state conflicts. But it also triggered many new – mostly intra-state – 
conflicts. Where the concept of security previously revolved around the territorial integrity of these 
states, it has now gradually been extended to encompass intra-state public and human security, 
including poverty reduction goals. And where the internal security of a state was largely a military 
matter within each of the two competing blocs, it has now been transformed into an international 
issue within a complex, multipolar structure of many actors.  
          At the international level, security is to an increasing extent viewed as closely connected with 
public welfare and the organization of the security sector as such (Kaldor 2000). Inequalities – both 
domestic and inter-societal – are viewed as breeding conflict, creating a greater propensity for 
uncontrolled and armed conflicts (Hurrell 1999). Non-state actors operating at the international 
level have increasingly appropriated a security role – either as security providers or as specialized 
fora of professionals whose voices authorize new and particular approaches to security, conflict 
prevention and conflict management. Principles of effective security sector governance and the role 
of development co-operation are currently debated in a number of international organizations, 
including the OECD (e.g. Hendrickson 1999; OECD 2000; Axworthy 1999; Duffield 1999).  
          In contemporary political science textbooks ‘national security’ is often reduced to a short 
discussion of old-fashioned military concepts, while long sections on environmental risk and social 
problems dominate the security issue (Kegley and Wittkopf 1999). Problems like drugs, the 
environment, domestic prosperity, competitiveness, social partnerships, free trade, energy 
provision, democracy, etc., are given prominent treatment in official security documents (White 
House, 1995; www.whitehouse.gov). One way of conceptualizing this is to employ the 
‘securitization’ term (Wæver 1997): Conceptualizing an issue as ‘security’-related justifies and 
paves the way for extraordinary forms of management, such as keeping things secret, conscripting 
soldiers, incarcerating citizens, and levying new taxes. In other words, security discourse is a claim 
for exceptionality from the popular project of the welfare state.  
          Because of globalization and the reduction of the state, the task of managing security has 
shifted partially to individuals and to local organizations and agencies, operating in partnership with 
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state authorities Also at this level, security may be an exceptionalist discourse. At the local level 
one can, under the security banner, dispense with good manners, comfort and politeness. Businesses 
must protect themselves against illegal acts that threaten their profits and existence, and the 
‘security’ discourse allows them to supervise, sometimes intimidate, their customers by the use of 
armed guards and CCTV cameras. 
          Furthermore, however, the discourse on social issues has been influenced by the broader 
notions of security: a new welfare state discourse is emerging, stressing less the social aspects of 
solidarity and re-distribution, and more the issue of ‘securing’ welfare against the risks of modern 
living. The governmental rationalities of ‘post-modernism’ (Giddens 1990:52) or ‘advanced 
liberalism’ (Dean 1999:164 ff.) bring this security issue all the way to the responsibility of the 
individual: technologies of the self, self-improvement practices in health and social areas, are now 
part of the repertory of governance ideas.  
 
2. Life, risks and politics in the San Diego/Tijuana border area: Governance and discourses of 
insecurity 
 
          In a modern border region, where the risk of armed conflict at the inter-state level has become 
a remote and abstract memory, the altered nature of security becomes clear. Military forces are 
certainly present, but as guards against illegal migrants and drug traffickers along the border 
(Andreas 2000).The substance of security has been almost completely reversed: risk and security 
issues are omni-present concerns for public and private organizations operating in the region, while 
the national issue has almost disappeared from the equation. 
          In the last decade, cross-border legal trade has increased; Mexican exports to the US have 
grown sixfold, and its imports from the US tripled (Clement ea. 1999:15f.). An equivalent increase, 
however, has taken place in trafficking in drugs, immigrants and other illegal goods and services. 
Security problems are perceived as ever more pressing, but the participants in the security discourse 
make up a new and diverse group. Although NAFTA is not, in the sense of the European Union, 
really a new level of decision-making above the national one, it does introduce new elements and a 
new rationality into the complex of public authorities in North America. A region like SD-T now 
has respectively four (Mexico) and five (the US) levels of decision-making influencing social life: 
federal, state, county (the US) and municipal/city  – plus the supranational aspects. And each level 
exists in a US and a Mexican version. Each level and each nation add a new context, a new set of 
rationalities in different compositions. 
          This section tries to capture specific instances of how the notion of (in) security is being 
represented, institutionalized and handled locally. In other words, the idea is to suggest how local 
perceptions of life and risks in the border area can be seen to impact on local attempts at managing 
the border area. The term ’manage’ (rather than ‘govern’) is crucial, for in line with the account in 
section one, a good many of the events, crises, scandals and misdeeds that feed the border discourse 
and form an important part of life at the border are being played out in a de facto political vacuum: 
quite often the (local) authorities on both sides of the border have neither the power nor the 
resources to address the catalogue of problems that economic liberalization in the 1990s has only 
exacerbated.  
          A fast growing body of organizations, institutions and networks, many locally embedded, are 
giving voice to particular aspects of the border problematique, a tangible demonstration of the 
retreat of the public sector and the complexity of post-modern security. At present, our empirical 
investigations only enable us to sketch the contours of the ways in which these local concerns 
translate into discursive and social practices that try to make up for the political paralysis. 
Therefore, far from qualifying the discussion we have launched in this paper in any substantial way, 
the observations below serve to map out the orientation of future empirical work. 
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2.1. The federal and state levels 
 
          Diving into the plethora of fora currently striving to give voice to the border issues, it is 
instructive to see how the US federal government views the situation and what initiatives, if any, it 
proposes in order to manage the Southwest border (which is of course much more than the San 
Diego/Tijuana region) above and beyond what is prescribed by NAFTA. And the post NAFTA 
period has in fact produced a number of responses that speak the (in)security issue and the dark side 
of economic integration. In May 1999, president Bill Clinton launched his Interagency Task Force 
on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border. This and other efforts such as the 
Southwest Border Partnership from 1997, were created to address ”the numerous problems that 
plague the southwest Border Region”.  The latter construction amounted to a reorganization of the 
so-called Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities and Champion Communities, all federal 
initiatives designed to  
 
”provide economically urban and rural areas and communities with real opportunities 
for growth and revitalization. [Their] mission is to foster self-sustaining, long-term 
economic development in areas suffering from pervasive poverty, unemployment, and 
general distress and to demonstrate how communties can achieve self-sufficiency by 
following innovative and comprehensive strategic plans formulated and implemented 
by alliances among public, private and nonprofit entities." 
(www.treas.gov/sw_border/origins).  
 
          In particular in the presentation of the Task Force, it is stressed that it highlights the 
President’s formal recognition of  ”the challenges confronted by many Border communities on a 
daily basis”. I.e there is evidence of the federal level recognizing the low politics of economic 
integration at the Border. At the time of writing, it is however not entirely clear just how much 
financial and other muscle that backs the initiative. Its mission is basically described as one of co-
ordinating and better leveraging ”existing Administration efforts aimed at the Southwest, in concert 
with locally led efforts, in order to elevate the standard of living and overall economic profile of the 
Southwest Border Region”. Interestingly for our purpose, its framework includes identification and 
development of ”new options that fill any current ’gaps’ in federal government efforts”. The goals 
are listed under four headings, Community Planning and Investment; Development of Human 
Capital; Sustainable Development and Infrastructure; and International Cooperation and Law 
Enforcement. The latter specifies two spheres of action: ”Protecting the Border, shoring up law 
enforcement and preventing crime”; and ”Advancing our partnership with Mexico”. In terms of the 
thematic organization of the web-site description of the Task Force, the order of appearance 
sketched foregrounds ’soft law’ techniques and amounts to a very noticeable backgrounding of 
themes like crime and traditional law enforcement.  
          This is in stark contrast to comments by observers critical of the Federal Government’s 
handling of the Border Region. When talking about the Southwest Border, crime is almost always 
synonymous with drugs and/or illegal immigration into the US. In his scathing critique of the U.S. 
and Mexico post-NAFTA drug control record, Peter Andreas sums up the situation on the U.S.-
Mexican Border as a result of two incompatible efforts: on the one hand, the creation of a borderless 
economy and, on the other hand, an increasingly, it appears, barricaded border (Andreas 2000;  
www.zianet.com/ircl/bordline/2000/b166comp). The lion’s share of money and political attention 
dedicated to managing the border, in the early-mid 1990s mainly with a view to securing the 
passage of the NAFTA, has been channelled into escalating efforts to police drug flows and, not 
least, projecting an image of drug control progress. A whole string of  ”highly visible but misleading 
indicators of government resolve – increased arrests, seizures, and so on – helped sustain this 
image and obscured the failings and flaws of the enforcement effort” (Andreas 2000).  
          Post-NAFTA, however, this policy response has generated a whole new set of increasingly 
intractable problems in the Border Region, a development which has been further spurred by the 
relative success of the U.S. interdiction campaign in the Caribbean which has made Mexico the 
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more attractive launch pad for cocaine into the U.S. A particularly vicious circle whereby 
improvements in cross-border management methods are promptly matched by improvements in the 
methods of drug smuggling, which are then accompanied by heightened media awareness, which in 
turn increases public pressure on government to do something, can be identified. And, unlike what 
the thematic organization in the President’s Task Force suggests, relatively few resources are spent 
on demand-focused measures (i.e. curbing the American appetite for illegal drugs, notably by 
education and prevention).  
          The insistence of maintaining the (practically impossible) distinction between on the one 
hand wanted migrant labour and, on the other hand, the unwanted persons in whom this labour is 
embodied makes it difficult to address many of the social and economic problems that plague (to 
use the phrase used in the Task Force quoted above) the Border Region. What the Task Force calls 
”new options that fill any current ’gaps’ in federal government” don’t come easily when the 
language available for speaking an important aspect of the border problematique is limited to a 
vocabulary tied to notions of illegal aliens. And, ”rhetoric aside […], the de facto immigration 
policy of the US government is not to make the US-Mexican border impermeable to the passage of 
’illegal’ entrants, but rather to regulate their ’flow’, while at the same time maintaining the official 
distinctions between the ’sending’ and ’receiving’ nations, i.e. between kinds of peoples, that is, to 
constitute classes of peoples – classes in both the categorical and social sense” (Kearney 1998: 
124). 
          All the bravado and all the fancy interdiction technology serve mainly to pacify an American 
public increasingly intent on defending its identity as North Americans, while the undisturbed flow 
of illegal aliens continues to provide the South West Border and beyond with a low cost labour 
force: ”Having lost control of geographic space in the Border Areas ” (Kearney 1998: 126), 
European-Americans view their power to legislate identities and practices as ’illegal’ as their last, if 
fast crumbling, identity bastion. 
          South of the border, Mexican federal authorities have been highly critical of  the US-
government’s treatment of the question of immigration. The Mexican government considers it 
damaging for the relationship between the two countries that US authorities deal with the issue as a 
justice and police - law and order - problem. On the Mexican side of the border, the issue of 
immigration appears as a problem of development – the income gap between the two countries is 
seen as the root cause. But its own development policies have caught the Mexican government in a 
trap. The maquiladora industrialization model was conceived in order to raise the economic level of 
the area, but it is a strategy that entails a level of wages so low that it will continue to stimulate 
Northwards migration. Furthermore, the strategy creates unintended consequences in other areas 
and for other layers of government, in particular with respect to urban governance at the state and 
municipal levels (housing, public service and security). 
          At the state level  - in this case the state of Baja California - authorities are very well aware of 
these contradictions and their effects on urban governance. In a 1996 program concerned with urban 
development in the region, Baja California state authorities established that the state has become 
“urban” - 80 % of the state’s rapidly increasing population (a consequence of the flow of people 
into the region) reside in areas which are characterized as urban, localized in the North near the 
border. More than half of the state’s population lives in the City of Tijuana. The central and 
southern parts of the state are mostly rural, housing the rest of the population. The consequences are 
the following: 
 
“The accelerating and disordered demographic growth in urban areas has generated 
a high demand for work and services, as well as maladjustments that become 
expressed in social conflicts…” (http:/www.baja.gob.mx/biblioteca/plan. 
 
          In another section of the program, this diagnosis is invoked to formulate a number of goals 
and concrete strategies with regard to future urban policies: the establishment of better urban 
planning systems, a higher degree of land tenure security and an improvement in public 
participation in urban policies.  
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          In a program concerned with social welfare, the state authorities of Baja California again 
refer to the rapid increase in the population, seeing it as a consequence of the flow of migrants from 
other parts of Mexico. Interestingly, the state government then directs its attention to the federal 
level:   
  
“It is important to implement policies at the national level which can serve not only to 
redirect or resettle possible migrants in their sites of origin, or in other poles of 
development…but which can channel special resources to the state as it is a receiver 
of migrant populations.” (op.cit.+ /poblacio.htm:2). 
 
          Here, it is argued that the flow of migrants should be redirected from their place of origin to 
other places than Baja California, and that the state of Baja California should receive special help 
due to its status as a receiver of migrants. On the other hand, the body mostly responsible for the 
delivery of this help is the federal government that resides in the capital of the country.   
          Given Baja California’s proximity to the United States, problems such as the northbound 
trade in drugs and immigrants, and the southward flow of different types of contraband have 
produced a level of violence not found in many other regions of Mexico. For one thing, violence 
and insecurity in this region often stem from confrontations between different economic groups 
competing for some degree of control over the area’s illegal activities. Furthermore, this seems to 
take place with the consent and sometimes even the protection of various law enforcement agencies, 
in particular police groups. A final important aspect has been the increasing militarization of the 
region – a consequence of the ‘war on drugs’. One of the most negative results of this development 
is the violation of basic human rights. As pointed out in a recent study by the Center for 
Borderstudies and Promotion of Human Rights (Mexican):   
 
“In states with large indigenous populations (such as Chiapas), complaints of human 
rights violations usually cite the Mexican military and paramilitary groups who attack 
civilians suspected of being members of or sympathizers with guerrilla groups. On 
Mexico’s northern border, however, added to the list are agents of the Federal 
Judicial Police (frequently members of the military "on leave"), officers of various 
State Judicial Police (PJE) units, and municipal policemen, who, taken together, 
represent the region’s primary perpetrators of human rights violations. Torture, 
abduction, forced disappearance, robbery, extortion, assault, illegal entry, and 
murder have become common components of the workaday tasks of such law 
enforcement agents.” (Solís 1998:1). 
 
          Federal and state authorities have taken several steps to improve the situation. In the early 
1990s a special, ‘clean and honest’ police force was established – the Beta Group – composed by 
well-estimated, -salaried and –trained officers. Recent evidence suggests, however, that corruption 
has become pervasive within the forces, much to the regret of public and private authorities in the 
region . 
 
 
2.2. The local level 
 
          With these glimpses of federal and state government’s discursive and social intervention in 
the Southwest Border Region– and the underlying rationalities of this intervention - we will turn our 
attention to actors and institutions in the San Diego/Tijuana Region. In the City of San Diego, 
conversations with different parts of the administration about cross-border issues reveal a history of 
slow rapprochement, relatively few and feeble institutionalized instances of hands-on collaboration, 
though possibly growing awareness in the political sphere of the need to do something proactively 
rather then merely fending off Border-related crime and being seen to seal off the Border from the 
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’Other’1.  However, if what a lot of local residents instinctively want to do is to forget about 
everything south of the border, then addressing Border issues in a more profound way and 
embarking upon serious cross-border co-operation become less of a political priority and are 
currently curiously absent from the both the City’s and the County’s official political 
communications. 
          One example of the relative silence that surrounds the Border question is the 2000 State of the 
County Address, which only mentions it twice, both times encoded in a economic, NAFTA like 
mode. The first reference does speak the insecurity theme, though very indirectly: 
 
”I would like to take a few moments to acknowledge some of the Board members’ 
specific accomplishments in the past year. Supervisor Greg Cos initiated the Border 
Development Zone – SB207 – to provide badly-needed funding for border 
infrastructure, so w can take full advantage of the opportunities created by expanding 
free trade with Mexico” (Jacob, 2000, www.co.san-
diego.ca.us/cnty/bos/sup2/speeches/2000sca: p. 2). 
 
          And towards the end of the address, in a section on what the county has done and can do to 
stimulate the local economy: 
 
”To further the enormous potential of cross-border trade, I will work to expand the 
model created by the East County Economic Development council with the 
Connectory to include Mexican companies in our data base, strengthening our 
economic ties and creating opportunities for businesses on both sides of the border” 
(ibid, p. 8). 
 
          In similar vein, among the themes discussed in the mayoral contest in San Diego in 2000, the 
border co-operation issue has been left largely unaddressed. None of the contestants have chosen to 
stress an aspect of local politics which may be too controversial to get out the vote among the San 
Diego citizens most likely to vote. 
          By contrast, at the administrative level, many local government officers appear acutely aware 
of the need to consult and work with their counterparts in Tijuana much more systematically and 
strategically.  In the early 1990s  co-operation between the two cities was close to non-existent. 
Following the intensification of activities in the wake of NAFTA, it was realized, on both sides of 
the Border, that NAFTA did not have sufficient teeth in relation to a host of practical and very real 
issues in the San Diego/Tijuana Region. San Diego’s then Mayor Golding initiated a decision to set 
up a framework for co-operation between the two cities capable of addressing these issues and 
today many San Diego City departments are involved: initially five and now ten committees have 
been set up (economic development, transfer of technology, environment/recycling, public safety, 
libraries, culture, border crossing, transport, water, sewage, telecomm., planning and land use). 
Every committee has a double chairmanship – the two department directors – and they meet every 
month with a general commission meeting every three months presided over by the two mayors.  
          However, despite recent years’ trend towards more local government level cross-border co-
operation, officers also point to obstacles in the two political systems that continue to thwart 
collaborative efforts, long-term commitment and planning. Therefore the committee framework 
described in the above is less of an executive body and more of a discursive community, voicing 
concerns and problems that other bodies then pick up and, perhaps, translate into action. On the one 
hand, after 11 years with PANista government, the City of Tijuana has experienced modernization 
and restructuring initiatives, trends also known across the Border in San Diego; and the issue of 
fraud has been addressed in a much more concerted fashion than before. On the other hand, the high 
turnover of both councillors and officers (re-election impossible combined with politically 
appointed key administrative staff) creates discontinuity. On the U.S. side, formal government 
                                                          
1 The following observations/reflections are based on interviews with officers in the City of San Diego and County of 
San Diego in March 1999 and 2000. 
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intervention, both local and even more so if cross-border, which involves strategic planning, 
funding and investment is seriously hindered by the general U.S. government phobia and intuitive 
hostility to anything that smacks of centralization. Instead, what tends to happen in these semi-
formalized cross-border government set-ups (remember, they are not backed by a formal legal 
basis), is that ideas are presented and quite often rejected, but not necessarily killed. What then 
sometimes happens is that they gain a life of their own, get latched on to a non-governmental 
organization’s project and then take off. Networks and linkages and a lot of informal interaction 
with the world outside the committee system are fundamental for the process to move on. Any 
realization of the idea that a border region contains a permanent transfer of ideas seems to depend 
on these ideas being lifted out of formal government structures and mediated and negotiated by 
other forces and interests.  
          Thus, despite the good intentions of the two administrations, several positive experiences at 
the interpersonal level across the two administrations, and the very tangible and material common 
concerns that they share, the general public remain hesitant, if not downright reluctant to entertain 
ideas about closer collaboration. The framework for action for politicians remains severely 
restricted by the negative connotations that life and social memories along the Border keep 
generating/feeding. People in San Diego remain unenthusiastic about Tijuana, which is seen as 
dirty, dangerous, and in every sense disheartening; wealthy people certainly do not cross the Border 
out of pleasure; Mexico/Tijuana is not only another country, it is another world, poor and corrupt, 
with a totally different system. The San Diego Business community is awash with anecdotes about 
how impossibly slow/unstructured/irrational Mexican business people are. In Tijuana, Los Angeles 
stands out as the more obvious object of economic and cultural interaction.  
          This is the background against which we see the emergence of a whole raft of sometimes 
competing, sometimes overlapping, sometimes supplementary, sometimes co-ordinating fora, to 
various degrees empowered and/or intent on promoting specific policies and initiatives. SANDAG’s 
list of binational links (www.sandag.cog.ca.us/projects/binational/binational_links)2, many of which 
represent responses to the local concern with (in) security gives an idea of the multifarious interests 
at play 
          SANDAG (San Diego Association of Governments) is part of the region’s formal governance 
structure, albeit not directly accountable to the citizens in the region. And this structure is vast and 
many-facetted, as the links list demonstrates.  Created in 1966, then as the comprehensive Planning 
Organization within the County administration under a state authorized Joint Powers Agreement, it 
was renamed SANDAG in 1980. From its modest beginnings in the late 1960s, it gradually 
increased its powers, in particular in the areas of growth management, habitat conservation 
planning, open space, traffic management and criminal justice, and its membership in the 1980s and 
1990s. Today, the region’s 18 cities and county government are voting members of the association. 
Supplementing these voting members are a number of advisory representatives, including the 
federal government and Tijuana/Baja California, Mexico.  A forum for regional decision-making, 
SANDAG aims at building consensus, planning strategically, obtaining and allocating resources, 
and providing information on a broad range of topics relevant to the region’s quality of life, many 
of which are of course intricately related to the region’s specific socio-economic traits. In its own 
                                                          
2 The organizations on SANDAG’s list have been categorized as either academic (e.g. California Center for border and 
Regional Economic Studies; Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias; Northern Border College; San Diego 
Dialogue; UCSD Center for US-Mexican Studies); economic (NAFTA; North American Development Bank 
(NADBank); IMF; OECD; UN Economic Commission for Latin America; Inter-American Development Bank; World 
Bansk; International Development  and Research Centre; SECOFI-NAFTA; Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit); 
environmental (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Commission of Environmental cooperation (CEC); Border 
Environmental Cooperation Commisssion; International Boundary and Water Commission; Secretariat for the 
Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries; National Commission for Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity; Center 
for Energy Studies; Border Pact (Partners in Action); Border Eco Web); Geographic Information Systems 
(Transboundary Resource Inventory Systems); governmental (Baja California State Government; Embassy of Mexico 
in the United States; National Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Information; Mexican Transport Institute; 
Organization of American States; SECOFI-NAFTA; Secretary of Exterior Relations). 
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words, it does so “without the need to create costly new government”. Governance-wise, SANDAG 
illustrates the degree of multilevelness in the region. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article 
to provide a more precise idea of SANDAG’s (and other actors’ mentioned here) place on the 
continuum of stateness and the correlation between this place, the powers and responsibilities 
assigned, and the nature of statehood. This is of central concern to the study that the present 
deliberations are planned to prepare.  
          At this point, we will limit our investigation of SANDAG to a conference sponsored by its 
Committee on Binational Regional Opportunities and the Consul General of Mexico in San Diego 
which both reflects and rearticulates the insecurity and the multi-level governance themes. 
Interestingly, its take on the situation is to view it as the result of deficient communications rather 
than deficient institutions – so there is a sense in which it depoliticizes the problems at hand and 
reduces them to differences in communication modes. 
 
“Building a Strong Region through effective communication, Seizing Opportunities in 
the California/Baja California Region. July 2000 conference sponsored by SANDAG’s 
Committee on Binational Regional Opportunities and the Consul General of Mexico 
in San Diego on the opportunities and challenges of cross-border communication: 
 
Over 4 million people live in the San Diego-Tijuana region, and projections indicate 
that within the next 15 years, our binational population could grow with another 2 
million people. This rapid development has spawned a myriad of environmental, 
social and political issues unique to the border region. As a result, the number of 
organizations and agencies conducting work along the border has markedly increased 
in recent years, as has the level of cross border communication and collaboration 
between and among the various sectors of our society. However, those involved in 
cross-border communication activities often encounter difficulties working across an 
international boundary. The ability to communicate across the border with the 
community and with the media is of utmost importance in order to promote existing 
and new cross-border initiatives. 
 
Additionally, a great deal of attention has been given to the problems that arise along 
our shared border resulting in a distorted public perception of the border region. Yet, 
many successful cross-border initiatives demonstrate that collaboration and regional 
Co-operation can and do work” (www.sandag.cog.ca.us/projec”). 
 
          Blaming the difficulties of cooperating across the border on ‘distorted public perception’ due 
to excessive attention to border problems seems to be a particularly impotent approach to the many 
problems in the area, an approach more intent on improving images than addressing problems. 
          South of the border, security problems may be more concrete and more acutely experienced. 
Recognized by the public and the municipal authorities of Tijuana as one of the highest prioritized 
fields of intervention, the security sector became reorganized and reinforced in the 1990s. A special 
municipal division for public security was established during the 1995-98 administration – la 
Secretaría de Seguridad Pública Municipal (PMD 1996). Among its specific objectives are: 
 
“To stimulate the participation of the different sectors of the community in the 
Municipal security programs… 
“To reinforce the relations, in terms of security, between the Municipality, other 
public institutions, and private entities, at the local, national and international 
levels..” (PMD 1996)    
 
           In the 1998-2001 municipal development plan (PMD 1998:113, 117), further steps to include 
citizens and ‘private entities’ in the management of security were taken. According to this 
programme, one of the most important technologies of crime prevention is “the consulting with and 
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participation of citizens in municipal security issues”. The plan furthermore emphasizes the 
importance of “Establish[ing] an agreement with the Association of Private Security Companies”, 
with a particular eye to colaborating with those firms in order to “Establish networks of vigilance, 
supervison, logistic support and training”.   
 
 
2.3 Non-Governmental Organizations  
 
On both sides of the border, NGOs of a variety of types have increased their presence in 
the regional arena over the last couple of decades. On the Mexican side of the border, this increase 
has been related to the process of political democratization and decentralization since the 1980s. Of 
particular interest in the present context, however, is the gradual development of transborder fora 
such as the San Diego Dialogue. San Diego Dialogue was established in 1991 and is a self-funded, 
regional public policy centre based at the University of California, San Diego. Directed by an 
invited membership of approximately 150 civic and community leaders from San Diego and 
northern Baja California it sponsors research projects and public education programmes on issues 
affecting the future of both San Diego and the San Diego/Tijuana cross-border region. Its research 
agenda and public programmes aim at addressing  
”the challenges and opportunities for regional development, including: 
- Planning a common, sustainable urban future with Tijuana; 
- Enhancing the role that both San Diego and Baja California can play in the growing 
global economy; 
- Ensuring educational achievement for all students in our elementary and secondary 
schools; 
- Creating an effective structure for regional governance.” 
(www.sddialogue.org/home/page) 
 
          These four issues are not markedly different from the Federal US governments themes for its 
Task Force mandate. But the San Diego Dialogue offers a fairly critical perspective on the Border 
region, and is definitely concerned with politics in its discussion of both the roots of the region’s 
problems, future scenarios and specific solutions: Ethnicity and immigration are not reduced to a 
matter of communication, on the contrary, ”engaging ethnic and immigrant communities in global 
trade … is one of the most important challenges for our region as it embraces the global economy”. 
And the notion of security is related to the creation of a more equitable society. However, as 
indicated in the above quotes, official comments on the state of the region and its future all 
presuppose embracement of the global economy and the inevitability of more growth. With 
Giddens, the Dialogue asks ”How far can we (…) harness the juggernaut, or at least direct it in such 
a way as to minimize the dangers and maximize the opportunities which modernity offers to us?” 
(Giddens 1990: 151). Obviously, a majority of residents have no faith in anybody’s ability to steer 
the juggernaut. 
          Together with the Public Policy Institute of California SDD has just released the results of a 
survey of San Diego residents and their attitudes towards the region’s quality of life, which shows 
that only 18% of area residents think their county will be a better place to live in 10 years from 
now. There are many and interrelated reasons for this gloom – perhaps the main concern is the 
perceived implications of a rapidly growing population and the pressure this generates on the 
region’s social and physical infrastructure, on its economic and cultural resources, and thereby on 
the security situation, in the broadest sense of this term. 
 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
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          The above considerations seem to indicate that security problems in the SD-T area are 
problems of growth: growth in the number of residents in the area, stretching all infrastructural and 
institutional capacities and resources to breaking point. And growth in cross-border traffic and 
trafficking, trailing a long line of typical border area problems of smuggling and legal evasion. 
Together, these growth phenomena create a complex and fluid situation, where numerous actors and 
structures interweave and relations are constantly shifting. Establishing any sense of security in 
such a context is extremely difficult. 
          On the supra-national level only economic regulations have been established – NAFTA does 
not concern itself with neither national security nor the social and human effects of freer trade. 
          At the federal levels, the US Federal Government has approached the situation with its Task 
Force signalling preventive efforts and soft law regulation, but the strategy pursued in practice has 
been one of militarization. The very visible effects of militarization – patrols, arrests, convictions, 
raids – are well suited for demonstrating performance, and as such fit in well with the government’s 
image strategies and with management ideas that prioritize the monitoring of performance. Until 
now, however, they have not proven successful in combating any of the security problems – real or 
imagined - in the region. 
          The Mexican federal government has plans for developing the area in an economic sense, by 
permitting maquiladora industries and releasing the traditional strong state controls. Security 
problems are also here handled by militarization, although the task is made difficult by corruption 
and inadequate equipment and provision of the forces deployed. The Mexican government seems to 
be caught in a trap where its continued reliance on the export oriented industrial development will 
produce severe problems in terms of safety and security in the northern border region. At the same 
time, state authorities blame federal government for its lack of interest in the social consequences of 
the development strategy.   
          At the level of local authorities, city and county, US politicians appear wary to be seen to get 
too involved in problems whose cure runs counter to deep-seated notions of minimal government: 
Regulating economic and residential growth means limiting the freedoms of citizens, and that is not 
popular among the voters in the region. A number of county and  city officials on the San Diego 
side,  however, show great enthusiasm for working with their Mexican counterparts. They 
experience the direct difficulties of  solving any sort of societal problems in a globalizing region if 
they do not co-operate with neighbouring authorities and institutions. 
          The Tijuana local government looks very much to the US as a source of resources and 
solutions to their problems. Interestingly, however, it seems that Tijuana authorities quite explicitly 
have opted for a ‘partnership’ strategy in terms of the organization of the security. In this line of 
thinking, security has become an issue that should involve society, and in particular the private 
sector provision of security. 
          The non-state actors in the region have an important and increasing role in pointing out the 
real threats to the security and well being of citizens and dysfunctions of the policies pursued. The 
more precise form and extent to which NGOs, research institutions, other associations, and not least 
private businesses, are involved in the co-ordination of the multiple interventions necessary to 
counter those threats, deserve a much more detailed study than we have been able to carry out in the 
present paper. At any rate, we may expect that ‘security problems’, even when defined as existing 
locally and in non-military matters, are hard to solve in the absence of an active and responsible 
state.    
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